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distribution of wealth-consumption ratio is a potentially important determinant for the implied
pricing kernel, additional to the cross-sectional distribution of consumption growth, while the
importance of this additional factor depends on the strength of temptation and self-control. The
estimates that we obtain provide evidence supporting the existence of temptation and self-control
in preferences. With reasonable precision, we estimate a signi¯cant present-biased temptation
strength, and we reject the null hypothesis of no temptation at common con¯dence levels. We
explore the quantitative implications of the self-control problems for equity premium, risk-free
rate, and asset price volatility.
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11 Introduction
Experimental evidence suggests that time-orientation is a common occurrence in intertemporal
decision-making. In the experiments, subjects reveal preference-reversals as time passes: they
would choose the larger and later of two prizes when both are in a distant time, but they would
prefer the smaller and earlier one as both prizes draw nearer to the present. A body of experimental
studies which document the self-control problems that take the form of such short-run urges is
surveyed by Rabin (1998), and heuristic psychological and sociological interpretations are also
summarized in Loewenstein (1996). The idea that many consumers would have a lack of such
self-control has also gained support in economics. The recent surveys by Ameriks, Caplin, Leahy,
and Tyler (2004) over a sample of TIAA-CREF participants not only provides evidence of a
lack of self-control among the survey participants, but indicates that self-control is linked to
\conscientiousness", and the resulting propensity to consistent planning, a modeling approach
which takes its root in Strotz (1956) and Peleg and Yaari (1973), and which gains an empirical
support in the light of the surveys of TIAA-CREF participants by Ameriks, Caplin, Leahy (2003),
and Ameriks, Caplin, Leahy (2002).
Standard economic models with preferences de¯ned over actual consumption bundles and with
exponential discounting do not allow for the observed preference-reversals and lack of self-control.
Recent theoretical modelling that aims to tackle this problem takes two alternative approaches.
The ¯rst approach addresses the preference-reversals using time-inconsistent preferences de¯ned
on the actual consumption [e.g., Laibson (1994, 1996, and 1997) and Harris and Laibson (2001)].
Here, dynamic inconsistency is introduced with hyperbolic or quasi-geometric discounting, while
self-control is not allowed.1 The second and axiom-based approach addresses the problem by
developing dynamically consistent preferences and utility representation over an extended domain,
the set of choice problems that includes not only the actual consumption but what could have
been consumed, namely, the temptation, in each period [e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004b,
and 2004c)]. This speci¯cation allows to capture the potential con°ict between an agent's ex
ante long-run ranking of options and his ex post short-run urges in a rational and time-consistent
framework. The agent might be better-o® if faced with a smaller opportunity set exclusive of the
tempting elements a prior; otherwise, he might either succumb to the tempting alternatives or
exercise costly self-control to refrain from choosing the tempting elements.
The time-consistent approach reconciles the many issues confronted by the time-inconsistent
models. Its admissibility to recursive formulation of preferences and utility representation makes
1For some conceptual or practical issues concerning this time-inconsistent approach, see, for example, Jagan-
nathan and Kocherlakota (1996), Rubinstein (2003), Gul and Pesendorfer (2004a), and Krusell and Smith (2003).
2its application particularly convenient. This is perhaps why it has gained an increasing popularity
in applied work in various ¯elds of economics since its original theoretical development a few
years ago.2 However, the applied work has encountered a short supply of empirical evidence in
quantifying the strength of temptation and self-control, or lack therefore, which is crucial for the
assessment of the signi¯cance of their e®ects in the areas of greatest economic importance.3
The current paper represents our ¯rst pass in taking up on this empirical task. We investigate
here the quantitative strength of temptation and self-control by empirically estimating, using the
generalized method of moments, a dynamic structural model of intertemporal consumption and
asset pricing that allows for, but does not assume, the Gul-Pesendorfer preferences. Hence, as to
its primary goal, our present work is related to DeJong and Ripoll's (2003) paper estimating the
temptation parameters in the Gul-Pesendorfer preferences by estimating a version of Lucas (1978)
model of asset pricing.4 A main di®erence between our paper and theirs is that we use panel data
constructed from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) in carrying out our empirical analysis
while, in contrast, they base their empirical investigation on aggregate time series data.5
In this perspective, our work is perhaps more closely related to the papers by Paserman (2004),
Fang and Silverman (2004), and Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2004), who all employ panel
or ¯eld data in estimating the quantitative e®ects of self-control problems under the speci¯cations
of hyperbolic time-preferences.6 Use of micro data is potentially important since time-orientation
2See, among others, Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2002) and DeJong and Ripoll (2003) for application to asset
pricing, Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2003) to taxation, Ameriks, Caplin, Leahy, and Tyler (2004) to survey
design, Gul and Pesendorfer (2004a and 2004b) to consumption-saving decision and welfare analysis, and Gul and
Pesendorfer (2004d) to harmful addiction. Related theoretical and applied work also includes Benhabib and Bisin
(2004), and Bernheim and and Rangel (2002), among others.
3Researchers have thus far largely calibrated models of preference-reversals to match some important moments
of aggregate data sets. Among others, Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (1998) calibrate the hyperbolic discount
factors in a model of saving for retirement, and Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2002) calibrate a variant of the
Gul and Pesendorfer model of asset pricing. Lack of direct empirical evidence on the quantitative strength of
temptation and self-control makes di±cult the quantitative evaluation of the importance of their e®ects. As Krusell
et al. acknowledge, \Our results are hard to judge quantitatively since we do not have any independent information
regarding the strength or nature of the possible savings urges among investors."
4The estimation by DeJong and Ripoll (2003) using the Bayesian method indicates the presence of a quantita-
tively signi¯cant temptation e®ect. But, these authors ¯nd that such e®ect, as they estimate based on aggregate
data, does not fully account for the level of stock price volatility observed in U.S. data.
5In particular, DeJong and Ripoll (2003) use annual data on the S&P 500 stock price and dividend series that
Shiller (1981) used, extended through 1999.
6In estimating the degree of time-inconsistency in hyperbolic time-preferences, Passerman (2002) estimates a
structural job search model using data on unemployment spells and accepted wages from the NLSY 1979, Fang and
Silverman (2004) estimate a dynamic structural model of labor supply and welfare program participation using a
single panel data on the choice of single women with dependent children from the NLSY 1979, and Laibson, Repetto,
3is argued to di®er a lot among decision-makers and it is often deemed as essential to allow for
individual di®erences in the degree of temptation and self-control.7 On a general level, preference
heterogeneity and idiosyncratic risks may have signi¯cant e®ects in the areas of critical economic
importance, such as consumption, saving, and asset pricing. For example, the importance for as-
set returns of idiosyncratic consumption risks, as relevant due to potential market incompleteness
or limited asset market participation in particular, has been recently revisited by Brav, Constan-
tinides, and Geczy (2002), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), Cogley (2002), and Jacobs and Wang (2004)
using the CEX data (see, also, the references therein for earlier and other contemporaneous studies
based on the CEX and other data sources). Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) speci¯cally emphasizes the
implications of idiosyncratic risks and aggregation bias for consistent estimation of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (EIS).
The main focus of the current paper is on joint estimation of EIS and the degree of tempta-
tion and self-control under a model speci¯cation that allows for the Gul-Pesendorfer preferences,
using the CEX data which allow to deal with individual heterogeneity and aggregation issues to
ensure consistent estimation and test overidentifying restrictions. The paper also explores the
quantitative implications of the self-control problems for equity premium, risk-free rate, and asset
price volatility. Our theoretical speci¯cation of the preferences and utility representation which
are potentially of the Gul-Pesendorfer type is consistent with the balanced-growth property. Our
empirical strategy is to focus on estimating a log-linear Euler equation, which is linear in parame-
ters, based on data constructed for synthetic panels under various grouping criteria to control the
aggregation process and to deal with measurement errors present in the individual data level in
the absence of market completeness. This is fundamentally the same approach taken by Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002), among many other researchers, under the traditional preferences.8 Because of
and Tobacman (2004) estimate a model of consumption and saving using ¯eld data on wealth accumulation, credit
card borrowing, and consumption-income comovement. In particular, Laibson et al. calibrate some of their model
parameters and estimate the discount factors using the method of simulated moments, and they reject the null of
exponential discounting in most speci¯cations.
7For instance, Della Vigna and Paserman (2004) present evidence on cross-sectional variation in the level of
self-control and show that it predicts cross-sectional variation in behavior. Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2002)
argue for the realism of di®ering degree of temptation and self-control among consumers, and they demonstrate
the potential signi¯cance of such heterogeneity in accounting for the high equity premium and low risk-free rate.
Ameriks, Caplin, Leahy, and Tyler (2004) provide evidence on the heterogeneity in the degree of temptation and
self-control and the importance for modelling it, based on a non-random sample of TIAA-CREF participants.
8The main advantages of such log-linear approach in a setting like the one in the current paper are demonstrated
by Attanasio and Low (2004). Cogley (2002) and Jacobs and Wang (2004) consider pricing kernels that are linear
in both the ¯rst- and the higher-order moments of the cross-sectional distribution of consumption growth.
4the allowance for the possibility of the Gul-Pesendorfer preferences in our speci¯cation, the cross-
sectional distribution of wealth-consumption ratio, in addition to the cross-sectional distribution
of consumption growth, appears to become a potentially important determinant for the implied
pricing kernel, while the importance of this additional factor depends on the strength of tempta-
tion and self-control.9 As a result, when applying the log-linear approach to our present setting,
it is of critical importance to distinguish not only mean consumption growth from growth in mean
consumption, but also mean wealth-consumption ratio from the ratio of mean wealth to mean
consumption, in order to recognize the distinction between the case with incomplete markets and
that with complete markets.
Our results are easily summarized. The estimates that we obtain provide evidence support-
ing the existence of temptation and self-control in preferences. With reasonable precision, we
estimate a signi¯cant present-biased temptation strength, and we reject the null hypothesis of
no temptation at common con¯dence levels. As a consequence, the mean wealth-consumption
ratio becomes an empirically important factor for the determination of the resulting log-linear
pricing kernel. We show analytically how temptation and self-control through the presence of
this additional factor a®ect the pricing kernel, and we explore the quantitative implications of the
self-control problems for some asset-pricing issues, such as equity premium and risk-free rate.
The remaining of the paper is organized in the following order. Section 2 presents a balanced-
growth consistent dynamic structural model of intertemporal consumption and asset pricing that
allows for the Gul-Pesendorfer preferences of temptation and self-control. Section 3 describes our
data source, discusses related issues on the measurement and de¯nition of the key variables, classi-
¯es three alternative criteria for identifying asset holder status, and explains our sample selection
criteria and synthetic cohort construction methods. Section 4 details our empirical method and
estimation strategy. Section 5 reports our estimation results and o®ers some discussions. Section
6 reports our ¯ndings about the e®ects of temptation and self-control on equity premium, the
Hansen-Jagannathan bound, and risk-free rate. Section 7 concludes the paper and points out
some avenues for future research.
2 A Consumption-Savings Model with Temptation and Self-Control
In this section, we ¯rst consider an in¯nite-horizon consumption-savings problem that allows, but
does not require, the possibility of temptation and self-control in preferences, as formalized by
9The importance of consumption-wealth ratio for asset pricing and evidence on the existence of a cointegration
relationship between the variables based on aggregate time series data have already been demonstrated in the
existing literature. See, among others, Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a, 2001b, and 2003).
5Gul and Pesendorfer (GP) (2001, 2004a, 2004b). We then characterize the stochastic discount
factor (i.e., the asset pricing kernel) in the presence of temptation and dynamic self-control.
2.1 An Axiom-Based Representation for Self-Control Preferences
GP (2001, 2004b) consider decision problems by agents who are susceptible to temptations in
the sense that ex ante inferior choice may tempt the decision-maker ex post. They develop an
axiom-based, and thus time-consistent, representation of self-control preferences that identi¯es the
decision-maker's commitment ranking, temptation ranking, and cost of self-control. According
to their de¯nition, \an agent has a preference for commitment if she strictly prefers a subset of
alternatives to the set itself; she has self-control if she resists temptation and chooses an option
with higher ex ante utility." They show that, to obtain a representation for the self-control
preferences, it is necessary, on top of the usual axioms (completeness, transitivity, continuity, and
independence), to introduce a new axiom called \set betweenness," which states that A º B
implies A º A
S
B º B for any choice sets A and B. Under this axiom, an option that is not
chosen ex post may a®ect the utility of the decision-maker because it causes temptation; and
temptation is costly since an alternative that is not chosen cannot increase the decision-maker's
utility.
Under these axioms, GP (2001) show that a representation for the self-control preferences
takes the form
W(A) = maxx2Au(x) + v(x) ¡ maxy2Av(y); (1)
where both u and v are von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions over lotteries and W(A) is the
utility representation of self-control preferences over the choice set A. The function u describes
the agent's ranking when she can avoid temptation through commitment, while the function v
describes the temptation facing the agent ex post. The term maxy2Av(y) ¡ v(x) is non-positive
for all x 2 A, and it represents the utility cost of self-control.
2.2 The In¯nite-Horizon Consumption-Savings Problem
Consider now a consumption-savings problem in an in¯nite-horizon economy with a large number
of households, idiosyncratic risks and incomplete insurance. Let ch
t denote consumption by house-
hold h, eh
t his endowment, and bh
t his wealth at the beginning of period t, where h 2 f1;2;:::;Ng.
The households have access to an asset market, where they trade I types of assets, in addition to
a risk-free asset. Let Ri
t denote the gross return of asset i 2 f1;:::;Ig from period t¡1 to t, and
R
f
t the risk-free rate. The households take the asset returns as given and choose consumption
and new wealth positions to maximize their life-time discounted expected utility. In his decision
6problem, a household faces a temptation to consume all his wealth, and he may exert e®orts
to resist such temptations, and these e®orts impose utility costs. GP (2004a) provides further
axiomatic foundations for self-control preferences in an in¯nite-horizon economy with uncertainty,
such as ours here. Following GP (2004a), we can formulate the decision problem for a generic




u(c) + v(c) + ±EW(b0) ¡ v(b)
ª
; (2)
where u and v are von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, ± 2 [0;1] is a discount factor,
and we have dropped the household index h to keep the notations brief. The term b0 denotes the
wealth in the beginning of the next period and is given by
b0 = e + Rb ¡ c: (3)
The ¯rst order necessary condition associated with the consumption-savings decision is then
given by
u0(ct) + v0(ct) = ±Et[u0(ct+1 + v0(ct+1) ¡ v0(wt+1)]Rt+1; (4)
where u0(¢) and v0(¢) denote the marginal commitment utility and the marginal temptation utility,
respectively, and wt = et + Rtbt denotes the consumer's total wealth in the beginning of period
t, that is, the maximum amount of resources that he can consume in period t if he succumbs to
temptation. The pricing kernel, or the stochastic discount factor (SDF), is here given by
mt+1 =
±[u0(ct+1 + v0(ct+1) ¡ v0(wt+1)]
u0(ct) + v0(ct)
: (5)
The consumption Euler equation (4) can then be rewritten as
1 = Etmt+1Rt+1: (6)
Our goal is to test the empirical importance of temptation and self-control in preferences. For
this purpose, we restrict our attention to a class of CRRA utility functions, with the momentary




; ;v(c) = ¸u(c); (7)
where ° is the coe±cient of relative risk aversion and ¸ > 0 measures the strength of temptation.





















We are thus testing the hypothesis that the SDF is characterized by (8) against the alternative
that it is described by (9). Or more explicitly, our null hypothesis is ¸ = 0.
The extra term in the SDF in the presence of temptation is a function of the wealth-consumption
ratio. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001, 2002) provide evidence that, in aggregate US data, wealth
and consumption are cointegrated so that this ratio is stationary. We further assume that asset
returns, consumption growth, and wealth-consumption ratio follow a jointly log-normal distribu-
tion. Under these assumptions, the consumption Euler equation (6) can be written as
0 = Et (ln(mt+1) + ln(Rt+1)) +
1
2
Vart (ln(mt+1) + ln(Rt+1)); (10)
where Vart is a conditional variance operator.
In the absence of temptation, the utility function reduces to the standard CRRA form, with
the SDF given by ln(mt+1) = ln(±)¡° ln(ct+1=ct). In this case, equation (10) leads to an empirical






= a0 + ¾ ln(Rt+1) + "t+1; (11)
where ¾ = 1=° is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), the intercept term a0 sum-
marizes the constants and the unconditional mean of the second (or, in case of non-log-normal
distributions, higher) moments of consumption growth and real asset returns, while the error term
"t+1 contains expectation errors and the deviations of second (or higher) moments of consump-
tion growth and asset returns from their unconditional means contained in a0. This equation
forms the basis for estimating the EIS (i.e., ¾) in the literature [e.g., Attanasio and Weber (1989),
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)].10
When temptation is allowed, the SDF takes the form as given by (8). Since all the variables
involved in the SDF are assumed to be stationary, we can take a log-linear approximation to the
SDF around steady state, with the resulting approximation given by


















where the term ·t+1 includes the second or higher moments in consumption growth and the
wealth-consumption ratio, and the parameter Á is given by
Á =
¸
(1 + ¸)Â° ¡ ¸
; (13)
10See also the exchange between Caroll (2001) and Attanasio and Low (2004) about issues related to estimating
log-linearized consumption Euler equations.
8with Â = w=c denoting the steady state ratio of wealth to consumption. Substituting this expres-
sion for the SDF into (10), we obtain an empirical version of the consumption Euler equation in












where the intercept term b0 contains the constants and unconditional means of the second or
higher moments of consumption growth, wealth-consumption ratio, and asset returns, and the
error term ºt+1 summarizes expectation errors and the deviations of second or higher moments
of the relevant variables from their unconditional means contained in b0.
To test the empirical presence of temptation is thus equivalent to testing the Euler equation
(14) under GP-preferences against its alternative (11) under CRRA utility. We implement this
empirical task by ¯rst obtaining joint estimates of the EIS parameter given by ¾ and the temp-
tation parameter represented by ¸ using GMM, and then test the null hypothesis that ¸ = 0.
To implement the GMM estimation, we use the log-linearized Euler equations (11) and (14) for
the two alternative speci¯cations of preferences, which, under rational expectations, imply the
moment conditions Et(Zt"t+1) = 0 for the standard CRRA utility and Et(Ztºt+1) = 0 for the GP
preferences, for any vector of variables Zt that lie in the information set of period t.11 Note that,
to obtain an estimate for ¸ under GP preferences, we ¯rst estimate ¾ and Á from (14), and then
compute the point estimate of ¸ from the relation
^ ¸ =
^ ÁÂ1=^ ¾
1 + ^ Á(1 ¡ Â1=^ ¾)
; (15)
where a hatted variable denotes its point estimate. We then obtain a 95% con¯dence interval for
the estimate of ¸ using the delta method. The null hypothesis that ¸ = 0 is equivalent to Á = 0.
3 The Data
In this section, we describe the data that we use to construct the variables used in estimating
the intertemporal Euler equation. The source of the household-level data is the Consumer Ex-
penditure Survey (CEX) produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). In what follows, we
11Although one cannot rule out the possibility that deviations of the conditional second or higher moments in
the Euler equations from their unconditional means might be highly persistent, so that the use of lagged variables
as instruments to estimate the Euler equations might be problematic in obtaining consistent estimates of the
parameters of interest, Attanasio and Low (2004) show that, when utility is isoelastic and a sample covering a long
time period is available, estimates from log-linearized Euler equation with varying interest rate are not systematically
biased.
9¯rst present a general overview of the CEX survey data (Section 3.1), discuss our procedure to
construct a pseudo panel with synthetic cohorts of households (Section 3.2), and describe our sam-
ple selection criteria (Section 3.3). We then explain how to construct measures of consumption
growth (Section 3.4), wealth-consumption ratio (Section 3.5), and asset returns (Section 3.6).
3.1 Overview
The CEX survey is conducted on an ongoing basis by the Bureau of Labor Statistics every quarter
since 1980. It is a representative sample of the universe of U.S. households. In each quarter, BLS
chooses randomly about 5000 households according to strati¯cation criteria determined by the
U.S. Census, asking them to report how much they spent on a variety of goods and services in the
three prior months. The 5000 interviews are split more or less evenly over the three months of
the quarter. Each household participates in the survey for ¯ve consecutive quarters, one training
quarter with no data in record and four regular ones, during which expenditure, income, and
demographic information is recorded. Financial information is gathered only in the last interview
for both asset stocks at the time and °ows over the last twelve months. In each quarter, new
households replace roughly one ¯fth of the participating households, thus the CEX is a rotating
panel covering a relatively long time period and containing considerable demographic information.
The survey attempts to account for about 95% of all quarterly household expenditures in
each consumption category from a highly disaggregated list of consumption goods and services.
This gives CEX data a main advantage over other micro-panel data, such as PSID, which reports
expenditures for food only. CEX data would be particularly useful if preferences are nonseparable
among di®erent types of consumption goods and services in the theoretical model [e.g., Hall and
Mishkin (1982), Zeldes (1989), Altug and Miller (1990), Cochrane (1991), Mankiw and Zeldes
(1991), and Jacobs (1999)]. Further, as shown by Attanasio and Weber (1995), food consumption
is a poor representative of consumption as a whole for investigations related to intertemporal
substitution or asset pricing. For its broad coverage of consumption expenditures, CEX data
have been widely used in the literature as an attractive alternative to aggregate macro data
such as those in the Nation Income and Product Account (NIPA) to study a variety of issues
such as inequality [e.g.,Deaton and Paxson (1994)], consumption smoothing [e.g., Attanasio and
Weber (1995), Attanasio and Davis (1996), and Kruger and Fernandez-Vilaverde (2004)], and
asset pricing [e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), Brav, Constantinides, and Gezcy (2002), Cogley
(2002), and Jacobs and Wang (2004)].
103.2 The Synthetic Cohorts
The short panel dimension of the CEX makes the use of direct panel techniques problematic.
Since each individual household is interviewed only 5 times (including a training period), we do
not have any °exibility on the time-series dimension in estimating the Euler equation if we were to
use individual household data. By exploiting the repeated nature of the CEX survey, Attanasio
and Weber (1989, 1993, and 1995) proposed that one can build a pseudo-panel in the spirit
of Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985), Deaton (1985), and Heckman and Robb (1985). As new
households from a randomly selected large sample of the U.S. population keep entering the survey,
consumption by the sampled households contains information about the mean consumption of the
group to which they belong. Thus, a relatively long time series can be constructed for each cross
sectional synthetic cohort (i.e., a typical group de¯ned by observable characteristics), and this
approach is know as the pseudo-panel technique.
We use the pseudo-panel technique to construct our synthetic cohorts based on the household
head's birth year [see also Attanaio and Weber (1995 and 1998) and Krueger and Fernandez-
Villaverde (2004)]. We de¯ne a birth-year cohort as a group of individuals who were born within
a given ¯ve-year interval, and then follow them through the whole sample period to generate a
balanced panel. We exclude from out sample those households whose heads were born after 1963
(younger than 21 in 1984) or before 1898 (older than 86 in 1984). The remaining households are
assigned to thirteen cohorts (i.e., thirteen ¯ve-year intervals) based on their ages in 1984. We then
further narrow down our sample by excluding those households whose heads are younger than 30
years in 1984 and those whose heads are older than 55 years in 1984, leaving ¯ve birth-year cohorts
in our sample, with the household heads aged between 31 and 55 in 1984 and between 48 and 72
at the end of the sample (the beginning of 2002). The reason that we exclude those younger than
30 years is that these households have not had the chance to accumulate su±cient wealth and
are thus likely to be liquidity constrained, so that the Euler equations may not hold; the reason
that we exclude those older than 55 years is that households typically experience a discrete jump
in consumption expenditures at the age of retirement, and it is not clear what causes such jump
and whether or not the jump is consistent with the Euler equation. Those individuals who are
older than 55 years in 1984 are likely to retire before the end of our sample in 2002, so we exclude
them from the outset.12
We also report results obtained from data constructed using the simple cohort technique,
an approach used by Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). Speci¯cally, we pool the ¯ve birth-year cohorts
12For a survey of the literature that documents the jump in consumption at retirement age and attempts to explain
the jump, see, for example, Attanasio (1999). See Laitner and Silverman (2004) for a more recent explanation.
11into a single large cohort, and compute the resulting cohort's consumption growth and wealth-
consumption ratio by taking cross-sectional averages for each time period. This procedure results
in a single time series.
3.3 Limited Participation and Sample Selection Criteria
The importance of limited asset market participation to consumption-based asset pricing model
has been widely recognized in literature [e.g., Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), Weber (1999), Brav,
Constantinides, and Geczy (2002), and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) among others]. The main issue
is that the consumption Euler equation holds only for interior optimizing decisions, that is, only
for those households that are not ¯nancially constrained. Thus, to obtain sensible estimates of
the EIS parameter and the temptation parameter based on the consumption Euler equation, we
need to focus on households who do participate in ¯nancial market transactions.
In practice, we select a sub-sample of households who are classi¯ed as \asset holders" based
on a similar set of criteria used by Cogley (2002) and Jacobs and Wang (2004). For a household's
Euler equation between period t and t + 1 to hold, the household must hold ¯nancial assets in
the beginning of period t, which corresponds to the beginning of the household's ¯rst interview
in the CEX sample. For this reason, our ¯rst category of asset holders include those households
who report positive holdings of \stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and other such securities" or \U.S.
savings bonds" at the beginning of the ¯rst interview.13 Our second category of asset holders
includes those households who report positive contributions to \an individual retirement plan,
such as IRA or Keogh" during the ¯rst two interview quarters (i.e, during period t). Our ¯nal
category includes those households who report receipts of positive dividend income or interest
income during the ¯rst two interviews. Note that our classi¯cation of asset holders covers a
broader sample than that used by Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), whose sample corresponds to our
¯rst category of asset holders. Based on these criteria, we categorize 42% of households as asset
holders, which is comparable to that in Cogley (2002) (40%) and in Haliassos and Bertaut (1995)
13We follow Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) in constructing this category of asset holders. Speci¯cally, we use two
pieces of information in the CEX survey: First, a typical household reports whether its holdings of the asset
category remained the same, increased, or decreased, compared to a year ago; second, a typical household reports
the di®erence in the estimated market value of the asset category held by the household in the last month with that
held a year before. Thus, we infer that the household has a positive value of holdings of the asset category at the
beginning of period t if the household holds a positive amount of asset at the time of the interview and the asset
value has either remained the same or decreased in the past year. If the household reports that an increase in the
asset value and the amount of the increase does not exceed the holdings at the time of the interview, we also infer
that the household has a positive holding of the asset category at the beginning of period t.
12(36:8%), but somewhat higher than that in Jacobs and Wang (2004) (31%) and in Mankiw and
Zeldes (1991) (27:6%), all of whom use a similar selection criterion but with a shorter sample in
the time series dimension.
To minimize the in°uence of measurement errors and other problems caused by poor quality
of the data in our estimation, we apply some further restrictions to our sample in constructing
the consumption growth data. First, we drop from our sample those households who report non-
positive real quarterly consumption. Second, as in Zeldes (1989) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002),
we drop outliers in the data for consumption growth rates since these data may re°ect reporting
or coding errors. Third, we drop the households with any missing interviews, since we cannot
compute semiannual consumption growth rate for these households. Fourth, we drop non-urban
households, those residing in student housing, and those with incomplete income reports. Finally,
we drop households that report a change in the age of the household head between any two
interviews by more than one year or less than zero, so as to rule out the possibility of drastic
changes in consumption behavior because of the change in household head. In addition, we note
that, starting in interview period in the ¯rst quarter of 1986, the BLS changed its household
identi¯cation numbering system, leaving no information about the correspondence between the
household identi¯cation numbers in 1985:Q4 and 1986:Q1, so we have to drop some observations
(7 monthly observations) related to this mismatching problem. A similar problem occurred again
in 1996, and we have to drop another 4 monthly observations of consumption growth rate.
3.4 The Consumption Growth Rate
We follow a similar procedure as in Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) to construct consumption growth
data using the CEX survey.14 We de¯ne consumption as the sum of expenditures on nondurable
goods and services. We obtain a consumption basket for each household in the CEX survey by
aggregating over various consumption categories reported in the survey to match the de¯nition of
nondurables and services in NIPA. A typical consumption basket includes food, alcoholic bever-
ages, tobacco, apparel and services, gasoline and auto oil, household operations, utilities, public
transportation, personal care, entertainment, and miscellaneous expenditures. By leaving out
expenditures on durable goods, we implicitly assume that utility is separable in consumption of
durables and of nondurables and services. We de°ate nominal consumption expenditures by using
the consumer price index for nondurables that is not adjusted for seasonality, with a base-period
of 1982-1984. In addition to constructing consumption growth rate, we also need to construct
14A similar procedure is also used by, for instance, Anttanasio and Weber (1995), Cogley (2002), and Krueger
and Fernandez-Vilaverde (2004).
13wealth-consumption ratio in order to estimate the Euler equation in the presence of tempta-
tion. The availability of household-level wealth data imposes restrictions on our choice of data
frequency. In particular, we focus on the semiannual frequency. The semiannual consumption
















where m refers to the ¯rst month that a household makes its consumption decision, m + 3 is the
month that the ¯rst interview is conducted, when the household reports expenditures incurred
during the prior three months (i.e., ch
m, ch
m+1, and ch
m+2), m + 6 is the month for the second
interview when the household reports consumption expenditure for m + 3, m + 4, and m + 5,
and so on. 15 Thus, for each household who has four complete interviews in record, we can
obtain one observation of semiannual consumption growth rate. Yet, given the survey's rotating
panel feature, we can construct a semiannual consumption growth rate for each month in a
given synthetic cohort, which is the cross sectional average of the consumption growth rates for
households in the same cohort. In particular, the average consumption growth rate for a speci¯c





























t denotes the number of households in cohort j in period t. Note that, if complete insur-
ance against idiosyncratic risks is available, then all households would have identical consumption,
and the average consumption growth rate for a speci¯c cohort described above would be identical
to the growth rate of aggregate consumption per capita (such as that in the NIPA). In general, if
there are uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, consumption would not be identical across households,
so that our measure of consumption growth rate as described in (17) would be more appropriate
than the one obtained from aggregate data.
Table 1 presents some summary statistics of our measure of semiannual consumption growth,
sorted by asset holder status and cohort groups.
3.5 The Wealth-Consumption Ratio
To estimate the Euler equation (14) in the model that allows for temptation and self-control re-
quires constructing data for not only the consumption growth rate, but also the wealth-consumption
15There is no direct data for monthly household-level consumption expenditures. But since the survey is conducted
in a staggered fashion, we can construct a semiannual consumption growth rate for each month within the sample
period.
14ratio. We now describe our procedure in constructing a measure for the wealth-consumption ratio
that is consistent with theory.
In our model, a household's wealth in period t is the maximum amount of resources available for
consumption in that period if the household succumbs to temptation. It equals the sum of period-
t labor income (or endowment) and the value of all ¯nancial assets available at the beginning of







where, as discussed in Section 2, eh
t is the household's labor income (or endowment), Ri
t is the
gross return of asset i from period t¡1 to t, and bih
t is household's holding of asset i carried over
from period t ¡ 1.
We are interested in obtaining the value of the household's asset holdings at the beginning of
the decision period (corresponding to bih
t in the model). Without loss of generality, we assume
that the household's ¯rst decision period corresponds to the beginning of the ¯rst interview.16
The CEX survey does not provide household-level ¯nancial information for each interview; it does
so only in the last interview. Fortunately, the survey provides us with both the asset holdings
by each household at the end of the interview period and the asset °ows for the same household
during the past 12 months covering the entire interview period. We can thus retrieve the asset
holdings at the beginning of the period t by subtracting the change in asset °ows during the entire
interview period from the end-of-interview asset stocks. The value of the household's assets in the
beginning of the ¯rst decision period can then be obtained by multiplying the asset holdings bih
t
by the asset's gross return Ri
t, and sum over asset categories i. The asset categories that we use in
constructing the wealth data include liquid asset holdings in the household's \checking accounts,
brokerage accounts, and other similar accounts," \saving accounts," \U.S. savings bonds," and
\stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and other such securities."17 To compute the total value of holdings
of di®erent types assets, we assume that a zero net return on the ¯rst category of assets (i.e.,
checking accounts, etc.); we use the 30-day Treasury bills returns as representing the returns on
the second and the third category of assets (i.e., savings, and savings bonds); ¯nally, we use the
NYSE value-weighted returns as representing the returns for the last asset category (i.e., "stocks,
bonds, mutual funds, and other such securities"). 18
16In our semiannual data, each period corresponds to half a year. Thus, within the entire interview period (four
quarters), the household has two decision periods: t and t + 1.
17We include here liquid assets only because the wealth in our model corresponds to the maximum amount of
consumption if the household succumbs to temptation. The assets must have su±cient liquidity so that they can
serve as \temptation."
18Clearly, we can obtain only one observation of asset value for each household during the entire interview period.
But this does not present a problem for constructing our sample with semiannual data, since we can obtain only
15Upon obtaining the asset value for a household, we can get the household's wealth by adding
up the household's asset value with its labor income earned in the decision period. The CEX
survey reports, for each interview, the \amount of earned income after tax by household in the
past 12 months." To calculate a household's semiannual labor income eh
t (i.e., income earned
during the ¯rst half year of the household's interview period), we ¯rst divide the reported annual
income at the time of each interview by four, and then add up the resulting quarterly incomes
for the ¯rst and the second quarters in the interview period. Similarly, the income earned during
the second half year of the household's interview period (i.e., eh
t+1) is the sum of the household's
average quarterly incomes for the third and the fourth interview quarters. Then, the household's







To get the wealth-consumption ratio for period t, we need further to construct the consump-
tion data ch
t for household h in period t. This is done by adding up the household's reported
consumption expenditures during the ¯rst two interview quarters.19 The wealth-consumption
ratio for household h in period t is then given by wh
t =ch
t , where both wh
t and ch
t are in nominal
terms. Finally, we average across households in a given synthetic cohort j to obtain a time series

















Note that, because of the rotating-panel feature of the CEX survey, we can construct the semi-
annual wealth-consumption ratio for each month within the sample period for a given cohort.
Table 2 presents some summary statistics of the wealth-consumption ratio, sorted by asset holder
status and birth-year cohorts.
3.6 Asset Returns and Some Timing issues
We use monthly NYSE value-weighted returns as a benchmark measure of nominal asset return
and monthly 30-day Treasure bill returns as a measure of nominal risk-free returns. To calculate
real returns, we use the consumer price index for urban households as a de°ator. As discussed
above, we are able to construct only one observation of consumption growth and of wealth-
consumption ratio for each household at the semiannual frequency. Thus, we need to convert the
monthly asset returns and risk-free returns into semiannual returns.
one observation of semiannual consumption growth rate for each household during the entire interview period, as
discussed in Section 3.1, so we need only one observation for the wealth-consumption ratio for each household.
19In our estimation, the relevant wealth-consumption ratio in the Euler equation is for period t + 1. So what we




t+1. To obtain c
h
t+1, we add up the household h's reported consumption expenditures
during the last two interview quarters.
16To construct semiannual asset returns from monthly returns involves a somewhat tricky timing
issue. As we explain in Section 3, the consumption growth data is computed as the ratio of
a household's total consumption during the second half of the year in which the interview is
conducted to its total consumption during the ¯rst half year (see (16)). The consumption-savings
decision can be made in any month during the ¯rst half year. If the intertemporal consumption-
savings decision is between the ¯rst month and seventh month, then the relevant semiannual
asset return should be Rm+1Rm+2 ¢¢¢Rm+6, where Rm+1 denotes the gross real asset return
between month m and m + 1, Rm+2 is the return between month m + 1 and m + 2, and so
on. But if the intertemporal decision occurs between the fourth and the tenth month, then the
relevant semiannual return should be Rm+4Rm+2 ¢¢¢Rm+9. Our construction of the semiannual
consumption growth data cannot distinguish between these two cases, thus we need to take a stand
on what measure of the compounded returns is appropriate to serve our purpose of estimating
the Euler equation. For simplicity and ease of comparison, we follow Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)
and use the middle six months of relevant asset returns as a proxy the asset returns of interest.
In particular, we use Rm+3 ¢¢¢Rm+8 as a measure of semiannual asset returns.
4 Estimation Method
We estimate the log-linearized conditional Euler equations of our model that allows for the Gul-
Pesendorfer preferences of temptation and self-control using the generalized methods of moments
(GMM). We test the statistic signi¯cance of the temptation parameter by also estimating a
restricted version of the model that does not allow for the temptation preferences and thereby
constructing a Wald test statistic. In what follows, we describe in sequel the equations to be
estimated, the instrumental variables to be used, and the estimation and testing procedure.
4.1 The estimation equations
The equation that we use in the estimation is a version of the log-linearized intertemporal Euler
equation (14). In particular, the estimation equation for a particular cohort j that consists of H
j
t











































17where ¾ is the EIS, the D's are monthly dummies that are included for seasonal adjustment, and
the cross-sectional average of log changes in the households' family size (denoted by ¢lnF
jh
t+1)
is included as a sole control for demographics features that may potentially a®ect the marginal
utility of consumption [see also Attanasio and Weber (1995) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)]. The
coe±cients in front of the monthly dummies, the ±'s, are functions of the subjective discount
factor, the unconditional mean of the wealth-consumption ratio, and the conditional second or
higher moments of the log asset returns, log consumption growth, and log wealth-consumption
ratio. We use three alternative measures of asset returns (i.e., Rt+1): the real value-weighted
NYSE returns, the real 30-day Treasury bill returns, and a joint return computed as the simple
average between the ¯rst two measures.
The error term ¹
j
t+1 consists of expectation errors in the Euler equation and measurement
errors in log consumption growth and log wealth-consumption ratio. It is also possible that
the conditional second or higher moments contained in the ±'s are not constant, in which case,
the ± terms captures the unconditional means of the second or higher moments terms, and the
error term ¹
j
t+1 contains the deviations of these higher moments from their unconditional means.
Even in this case, as long as variations in these higher moment terms are not correlated with
the instruments that we are using, we can still obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of
interest (i.e., ° and Á).
Even in the presence of measurement errors, one can still obtain consistent estimates of the
EIS and the temptation parameter under some conditions. A su±cient condition is that the
measurement errors in individual consumption and in wealth are multiplicative and proportional
to each other (with a constant proportionality), and that they are independent of the true levels
of consumption and wealth, independent of asset returns and of the instruments.20 Under these
conditions, we can obtain consistent estimates of the EIS and the temptation parameter using the
log-linearized Euler equation (19), with log consumption growth being a left-hand-side variable
and with lagged consumption growth rates excluded from the set of instrumental variables.
In estimating the restricted version of our model that does not allow for the temptation
preferences, we simply estimate (19) while imposing the restriction that Á = 0.
4.2 Instrumental variables
Under rational expectations, the expectation errors in ¹t+1 are uncorrelated with any variables
in the information set of period t. Let Zt denote a vector of variables in the period-t information
20For a similar argument in the context of estimating EIS alone, see Attanasio and Weber (1995) and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002).
18set. For simplicity, assume that the second or higher moment terms of the relevant variables in
the estimation equation (19) are either constant or uncorrelated with Zt. Then, in the absence of
measurement errors, we have EtZt¹t+1 = 0, which are the moment conditions that we use in our
estimation.
The instrumental variables that we use are a subset of the variables in Zt. The instruments
should be uncorrelated with the error term ¹t+1 and correlated with the explanatory variables
Rt+1 and lnwt+1=ct+1. In addition to the monthly dummies and the changes in family size, we
include in the set of instrumental variables (i) the log dividend-price ratio computed as the ratio of
dividends paid during the previous 12 months to the current-period S&P 500 index price, (ii) the
lagged, log real value-weighted NYSE returns, and (iii) the lagged, log real 30-days Treasure bill
return, all of which are known to be good predictors of real stock returns and Treasure bill returns.
As such, they are likely to be correlated with the wealth-consumption ratio for asset holders. All
these ¯nancial time series are downloaded from Center for Research of Security Prices.21
In our model, the decision period for an individual household is one half of a year, while the
rotating-panel feature of the CEX survey implies that the time-series variables in the estimation
equation (19) for a given cohort have monthly frequency. Thus, caution needs to be applied
in constructing the lagged asset return data as instruments. Our construction of the semian-
nual consumption growth rates implies that consumption growth of a given cohort for adjacent
months should have partially overlapping months and thus overlapping expectation errors. For
this reason, the error term in log-linearized estimation equation (19) may be autocorrelated. To
ensure that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms, we use the compounded re-
turn Rm¡5Rm¡4 ¢¢¢Rm as the lagged asset returns in our set of instrumental variables, where the
return in the latest month Rm is the return for assets between period m ¡ 1 and m, so that the
compounded, lagged, returns here are not correlated with the expectation errors that are relevant
for the decision described by the Euler equation, despite of the overlapping nature of the errors.
4.3 Estimation and Testing Procedure
We use linear GMM estimation to obtain estimates of the EIS and the temptation parameter
in (19), and explicitly account for autocorrelation of the MA(6) form and for heteroscedasticity
of arbitrary forms in the error term. Autocorrelation in the error term may arise, as discussed
above, from the overlapping nature of consumption growth and thus of expectation errors; and
heteroscedasticity may present because of varying numbers of observations for each cohort cell
21We do not include lagged log consumption growth in the set of instrumental variables to avoid measurement
error issues discussed above.
19over time. We use instrumental variables in the estimation to avoid inconsistent estimates of the
parameters of interest because of possible endogeneity of asset returns and wealth-consumption
ratio to expectation errors. We use the optimal weighting matrix in the GMM estimation.
In our estimation, we experiment with two di®erent cohort techniques, the simple cohort
approach used by Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and the birth-year cohort approach proposed by At-
tanasio and Weber (1995). Under the simple-cohort technique, we obtain a single time series of
consumption growth and of wealth-consumption ratio by taking the cross-sectional average of these
variables at the household level across all households classi¯ed as asset holders. Under the birth-
year cohort approach, we obtain a time series of consumption growth and wealth-consumption
ratio for each birth-year cohort by taking cross-sectional averages across asset-holding households
within each cohort. As discussed in Section 3.2, our birth-year cohorts consist of ¯ve-year in-
tervals, and we focus on households whose heads are aged 30 to 54 years in 1984, so that we
have ¯ve birth-year cohorts and thus ¯ve cohort-speci¯c time series of consumption growth and
of wealth-consumption ratio.
Our goal is to obtain consistent joint estimates of the EIS and the temptation parameter
and test the statistical signi¯cance of the latter. Our estimation yields points estimates for the
parameters ¾ and Á, but not ¸ (the parameter measuring the strength of temptation), where
Á is a nonlinear function of ¸, ¾, and the steady-state value of wealth-consumption ratio, as
described by (13). We apply the Delta methods to calculate the point estimate of ¸ and its 95%
con¯dence interval using the estimates for ¾ and Á, as well as the time-series sample mean of the
wealth-consumption ratio.
To test the statistical signi¯cance of the presence of temptation, we follow two steps. First,
we estimate the unrestricted model given by (19). Second, we estimate a restricted model that
imposes the restriction that Á = 0 (or equivalently, ¸ = 0), that is, the standard Euler equation
with CRRA utility. We then test the null hypothesis that Á = 0 using a Wald statistic obtained as
the ratio of the minimized quadratic objective in the restricted model to that in the unrestricted
model, adjusted by the sample size and the degree of freedom. The test statistic has a Â2
distribution with a degree of freedom equal to the number of restrictions (one restriction here).
5 Results
The results of the GMM estimations of the log-linearized model of equation (19) are shown in
Table 3. The estimates of the parameters of interest are grouped by di®erent synthetic cohort
techniques, that is, simple cohort versus birth-year cohorts, as described in Section 4.3. In
20The ¯rst two columns (1a-1b) in Table 3 present the results from estimating the Euler equations
with a single time series constructed by following the simple-cohort technique.22 To test the
statistical signi¯cance of temptation, we estimate both the unrestricted model as described by
(19) and a restricted model with ¸ = 0 imposed, which corresponds to the standard model with
CRRA utility, as in Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). Column (1a) reports the estimated value of the
EIS in the restricted model, using value-weighted NYSE returns as a proxy for asset returns. The
point estimate for EIS here is 0:271, very close to the value obtained by Vissing-Jorgensen (2002,
Table 2) for stockholders (her estimate is 0:299). The point estimate of ¾ as reported in Column
(1a) is not statistically signi¯cant, although one cannot reject the overidenti¯cation restrictions
based on Hansen's J-statistic. In the unrestricted model where we allow for temptation, the point
estimate for ¾ increases to 0:878, and is still insigni¯cant, with a standard error of 0:804. The
point estimate of Á is 0:04, with a standard error of 0:043. Similar to the restricted model, one
cannot reject the overidenti¯cation restrictions based on the J-statistic. Yet, one cannot reject
the null hypothesis that ¸ = 0 based on the Wald-statistic with a p-value of 0:36. In this case,
the implied value of ¸ is 0:87, with a wide 95% con¯dence interval, as calculated using the Delta
method. However, the rejection of the presence of temptation, as well as the inaccurate estimates
of the EIS and the temptation parameter, may simply re°ect the small sample size under the
simple-cohort technique, which uses 199 observations in the estimation.
The synthetic cohort approach based on birth-year cohorts does not share this problem.
Columns (2a-4b) report the estimates of the two alternative (unrestricted and restricted) mod-
els, using the pseudo-panel data constructed based on birth-year cohorts, with the three pairs
of columns corresponding to the estimation results using three di®erent proxies of asset returns.
Each pseudo panel consists of ¯ve time-series, corresponding to the ¯ve birth-year cohorts. The
sample size is now 988, close to ¯ve times as much as that under the simple-cohort technique.23
Columns (2a-2b) report the estimation and testing results using the value-weighted NYSE
returns as a proxy for asset returns. The point estimates of the EIS here are similar to those
22Each time series has 199 monthly observations, covering the sample from October 1983 to March 2001, where
11 monthly observations are missing because of the mismatching problem in the identi¯cation numbering system
in 1986 and 1996. Note that, the earliest interview period is the ¯rst quarter of 1984, when the households report
consumption expenditures in the past three months, so that we can construct a cohort-speci¯c consumption growth
series that starts in October 1983. The last interview period in our sample is the ¯rst quarter of 2002. Since
a household's intertemporal consumption-savings decision shifts consumption between the ¯rst half year and the
second half during the interview period, we need a whole year's consumption data to construct a consumption
growth rate for a given household, so that the last available consumption growth data ends by March 2001.
23In the pseudo panel, some birth-year cohort cells are empty, so that the total number of observations in the
panel is slightly less than ¯ve times that under the simple-cohort approach.
21obtained using the simple-cohort technique, which use the same proxy for asset returns but with
a single time series rather than a panel of data. The main di®erence here is that, in the unrestricted
model, the estimates of both the EIS and the temptation parameter are now statistically signi¯cant
at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively, and that the Wald-statistic and the associated p-value
indicate strong rejection of the null hypothesis that ¸ = 0, providing statistical support for
presence of temptation and self-control. The point estimate of the EIS is ¾ = 0:98, with a standard
error of 0:496; the point estimate of Á is 0:055, with a standard error of 0:029. This information,
coupled with the fact that the sample-mean of the wealth-consumption ratio is ¹ Â = 9:31, implies
that ¸ = 1:05, with a 95% con¯dence interval between ¡2:93 and 5:02. As in the case with a
simple cohort, the J-statistic here cannot reject the overidenti¯cation restrictions in the model
that allows for temptation. Unlike the previous case, however, the J-statistic here does indicate
rejection of the overidenti¯cation restrictions in the model with the standard CRRA utility.
To examine the robustness of the results, we also estimate and test the models using some
other proxies for asset returns. Columns (3a-3b) report the results when we replace the stock
returns by the risk-free returns measured by the returns on 30-day Treasury bills. The estimates
of the EIS in both models are now greater than unity and notably larger than those obtained
using stock returns. They are both signi¯cant at the 95% level.24 The point estimate for Á is now
0:025, with a standard error of 0:015, somewhat smaller and less signi¯cant than in the case when
stock returns are used. The implied value for ¸ is 0:05, with a 95% con¯dence interval between
¡0:02 and 0:13. The Hansen's J-statistic fails to reject the overidenti¯cation restrictions in each
model. As in the case with stock returns, the Wald-statistic and the associated p-value indicate
strong rejection of the null that ¸ = 0, suggesting the presence of temptation and self-control.
Finally, in Columns (4a-4b), we implement a joint estimation by combining stock return and
risk free Treasury bill return in one regression. The asset return is here a simple average of stock
returns and Treasury bill returns. The estimated values of the EIS in the two alternative models
lie somewhere between those obtained from stock returns data (Column 2) and those from risk-
free returns data (Column 3). The Wald-test of model restrictions strongly rejects the null that
¸ = 0 (with a p-value of 4%). The point estimate of ¸ is now 0.26 with 95% con¯dence interval
between ¡0:08 and 0:59. The presence of temptation and self-control is again evident.
24This result is similar to that obtained by Vissing-Jorgensen (2002).
226 Some Applications in Asset Pricing
We now examine some quantitative implications of temptation and self-control utility for some
asset-pricing issues, such as equity premium and risk-free rate.
6.1 Equity Premium and the Hansen-Jaganathan Bound
Let R
f




the excess return. It is straightforward to show that the risk-free return equals the inverse of the







Using this relation and the intertemporal Euler equation (6), we obtain the unconditional mean





Let ½(m;Re) denote the correlation coe±cient between the SDF and the excess return, and
¾(x) denote the standard deviation of a variable x. Using the relations that Cov(m;Re) =








where the last approximation follows from the assumption of log-normal distribution of the SDF.










¾2(¢lnct+1) + Á¡; (23)
where ¢lnct+1 = ln(ct+1=ct) denotes the log-growth rate of consumption, and the term ¡ is given
by
¡ = ¾(lnÂt+1)[Á¾(lnÂt+1) ¡ 2¾(¢lnct+1)½(¢lnct+1;lnÂt+1)]; (24)
where Ât+1 = wt+1=ct+1 denotes the wealth-consumption ratio.
Clearly, without temptation and self-control, Á = 0 so that ¾(lnm) = °¾(¢lnct+1) and the







In the US data, average excess return is about 0:8 percent and the standard deviation of the
excess return is about 0:16 percent, so that the sharp ratio is about
jE(Re)j
¾(Re) = 0:5 (see, for
example, Cochrane (2005)). Since the standard deviation of consumption growth in aggregate US
23data is around 0:01 percent, the HJ bound requires a risk-aversion of an implausible magnitude:
° has to be greater than or equal to 50! This illustrates a version of the equity premium puzzle
¯rst presented by Mehra and Prescott (1985).
A natural question is then: Does introducing temptation and self-control in the utility function
help resolve the equity premium puzzle? Comparing the HJ bound under the GP preferences (23)
and the one under the standard CRRA utility (25), we see that the answer depends on the
sign and magnitude of the term Á¡, where ¡ is given by (24). As long as consumption growth
and the wealth-consumption ratio are negatively correlated, we would have ¡ > 0 and things
would be moving to the right direction. Indeed, in our sample of households who hold assets in
the CEX data, the correlation coe±cient between consumption growth and wealth-consumption
ratio is about ¡0:09, so that ¡ > 0. Now, what about the magnitude? To see how large the
temptation parameter Á should be to help resolve the equity premium puzzle, we ¯rst ¯x the risk
aversion parameter at ° = 1, which is close to its point estimate in the presence of temptation,
as reported in Table 5 (column 2b). We then use the sample standard deviation of consumption
growth given by ¾(¢lnc) = 0:04, the standard deviation of logged wealth-consumption ratio
given by ¾(lnÂ) = 0:39, and a sample correlation of ½(¢lnc;lnÂ) = ¡0:09 between these two
variables to compute a lower bound for Á so that the HJ bound in (23) is satis¯ed, that is,
°
p
var(¢lnct+1) + Á¡ ¸ 0:5. It turns out that to satisfy the HJ bound requires Á > 1:26. In
contrast, the largest point estimate for Á is no larger than 0:06, roughly two orders of magnitude
lower than that required to satisfy the HJ bound! Thus, although the strength of temptation is
empirically signi¯cant, allowing for temptation and self-control in utility does not help explain
the equity premium puzzle.
6.2 The Risk-Free Rate
A related puzzle in the asset-pricing literature is why the observed risk-free rate is much lower
than the theoretical predictions. The risk-free return is related to the SDF through (20), which,
under the assumption of log-normal distributions, lead to
r
f
t = ¡ln± + ln(1 + Á) + °Et¢lnct+1 ¡ Á°Et(lnÂt+1 ¡ lnÂ) ¡
°2
2





t , and we have used the log-linear approximation to the SDF as in (12). Here, the
term ¡t takes a similar form as in (24), with conditional moments in place of the unconditional
moments. The presence of temptation (i.e., with Á > 0) has an ambiguous e®ect on the risk-free
rate. A larger value of Á tends to increase the risk-free rate through the constant term ln(1+ Á);
meanwhile, it tends to lower the risk-free rate through the additional second-moment term Á¡t,
24which, as we show above, is positive in our sample. Within an empirically plausible range of the
temptation parameter values, the overall e®ect on the risk-free rate is likely small. Thus, allowing
for temptation and self-control in utility does not help explain the risk-free rate puzzle either.
7 Conclusion
In a series of important contributions, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004a, 2004b) have laid down a
theoretical, axiomatic, foundation for the representation of preferences that allows for temptation
and self-control. One of the main attractions of the axiomatic approach is that such preference
representation is time-consistent, and is thus suitable to be used to study optimal policies that
are designed to maximize a well-de¯ned social welfare objective. Temptation and self-control
preferences have many important implications on macroeconomic issues such as social security
reform, income tax reform, and a variety of asset-pricing issues [e.g., Krusell and Smith (2003),
Krusell, et al. (2002, 2003), DeJong and Ripoll (2003), and the survey by Gul and Pesendorfer
(2004b)]. To assess with con¯dence the quantitative importance of such preferences for these
prominent issues, one wants to ¯rst get a sense of whether the presence of temptation and self-
control in preferences is supported by individual household-level data.
This paper provides a ¯rst attempt to estimate the strength of temptation and self-control
using household-level data. We have presented a simple in¯nite-horizon consumption-savings
model that allows, but does not require, temptation and self-control in preferences. We have shown
that, in the presence of temptation and self-control, the stochastic discount factor (i.e., the asset-
pricing kernel) is a function of not only consumption growth, as in standard models with CRRA
utility, but also wealth-consumption ratio. We show that this is a feature unique to our model with
temptation and self-control preferences. Using individual household-level data on consumption
and wealth from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey, we have obtained statistically signi¯cant
joint estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the parameter measuring the
strength of temptation and self-control. Our aggregation procedure in constructing the data
for estimating these parameters of interest allows for the possibility of uninsurable idiosyncratic
shocks, and our empirical results lend support to the presence of temptation and self-control in
individuals' preferences.
The theoretical results and empirical estimations presented in this paper suggest that the
wealth-consumption ratio along with the consumption growth for asset holders, as broadly de¯ned,
should jointly determine the asset-pricing kernel. As a preliminary application of our results, we
have examined here the implications of allowing for temptation and self-control in preferences for
25several asset-pricing issues, such as those on the equity premium, the Hansen-Jagannathan bound,
and the risk-free rate, and we found that the e®ects of our estimated, statistically signi¯cant
strength in temptation and self-control on these asset pricing anomalies are not quantitatively
very signi¯cant. Notwithstanding these ¯ndings, our results imply more directly that the wealth-
consumption ratio for asset holders may serve as a pricing or conditioning factor in helping forecast
future asset returns or explain the cross-section of asset returns. In a sense, aggregate wealth-
consumption ratio has already been identi¯ed in the previous research as a useful conditioning
variable within the context of the consumption-based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) to
account for the cross-section of asset returns [e.g., Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a, 2001b, 2004)].
Yet, the wealth-consumption ratio as at the aggregate level has been found to lack out-of-sample
forecasting power in predicting future assets returns [see, for example, the exchange between
Lettau and Ludvigson (2002) and Brennan and Xia (2002). See, also, Avramov (2002)]. Various
statistical reasons, such as the lack of enough time-series observations, have been proposed to
explain the lack of out-of-sample forecasting power of this theoretically justi¯ed factor. A natural
next step for future research is to explore the power in predicting asset returns of the wealth-
consumption ratio at the individual level for asset holders who are subject to temptation and
self-control, based on micro-level data, such as the pseudo-panel data constructed here from the
CEX. In addition to addressing directly the sample-size problem confronted by the aggregate
time series data, this proposed avenue for future research allows to capture, at least in part, the
e®ects of market incompleteness and uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks along with temptation and
self-control in preferences, which may be of critical importance for testing power.
Needless to say, one can also investigate the quantitative importance of temptation and self-
control for many other important economic issues, including various issues in public ¯nance, such
as those associated with social security reform that has been catching much attention lately.
Doing so would certainly require a reliable empirical assessment of the strength of temptation
and self-control in preferences. Our work represents a ¯rst step toward this direction.
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30Table 1.
Summary Statistics for Consumption Growth
No. Obs Mean S.D. Skew. Kurt. Min Max 1% 99%
Panel A: Individual Consumption Growth
ALL 19060 0.010 0.305 -0.017 5.240 -1.575 1.605 -0.805 0.825
Asset Holder 8116 0.010 0.308 -0.060 5.346 -1.575 1.605 -0.808 0.834
Panel B: Consumption Growth for Simple Cohort (single time series)
ALL 199 0.010 0.044 -0.097 3.140 -0.109 0.123 -0.093 0.115
Asset Holder 199 0.011 0.061 -0.214 2.732 -0.157 0.143 -0.147 0.137
Panel C: Birth-Year Cohort, 1949 ¡ 1953
ALL 199 0.012 0.063 -0.014 2.664 -0.163 0.172 -0.140 0.150
Asset Holder 199 0.011 0.093 -0.054 3.295 -0.266 0.247 -0.245 0.244
Panel D: Birth-Year Cohort, 1944 ¡ 1948
ALL 199 0.008 0.070 0.249 2.925 -0.153 0.222 -0.119 0.209
Asset Holder 199 0.013 0.100 -0.323 3.926 -0.408 0.252 -0.201 0.242
Panel E: Birth-Year Cohort, 1939 ¡ 1943
ALL 199 0.007 0.081 -0.057 2.947 -0.217 0.217 -0.204 0.199
Asset Holder 199 0.019 0.130 -0.089 4.090 -0.465 0.469 -0.318 0.328
Panel F: Birth-Year Cohort, 1934 ¡ 1938
ALL 199 0.009 0.094 0.595 5.747 -0.299 0.479 -0.211 0.236
Asset Holder 193 0.011 0.138 0.820 6.856 -0.387 0.751 -0.308 0.449
Panel G: Birth-Year Cohort, 1929 ¡ 1933
ALL 199 0.008 0.099 -0.188 3.512 -0.368 0.256 -0.252 0.237
Asset Holder 198 0.005 0.155 -0.267 4.267 -0.522 0.465 -0.467 0.464
Panel H: Consumption Growth for All Birth-Year Cohorts (pooled synthetic panel)
ALL 995 0.009 0.082 0.121 4.433 -0.368 0.479 -0.190 0.216
Asset Holder 988 0.012 0.125 0.041 5.461 -0.522 0.751 -0.319 0.315
31Table 2.
Summary Statistics for Wealth-Consumption Ratio
No. Obs Mean S.D. Skew. Kurt. Min Max 1% 99%
Panel A: Individual Wealth-Consumption Ratio
ALL 19060 5.596 11.84 14.87 433.5 -146.5 501.2 0 46.76
Asset Holder 8116 9.021 17.09 10.96 225.7 -146.5 501.2 0 74.50
Panel B: Wealth-Consumption Ratio for Simple Cohort (single time series)
ALL 199 5.732 2.110 2.048 8.601 3.143 16.78 3.215 15.15
Asset Holder 199 8.933 4.351 1.619 5.475 4.233 27.16 4.381 24.06
Panel C: Birth-Year Cohort, 1949 ¡ 1953
ALL 199 5.407 3.134 3.977 25.34 2.438 29.62 2.10 21.25
Asset Holder 199 8.192 6.428 4.059 25.71 2.233 58.53 2.041 39.03
Panel D: Birth-Year Cohort, 1944 ¡ 1948
ALL 199 5.544 2.561 2.396 11.33 2.397 20.14 2.772 17.58
Asset Holder 199 8.420 5.442 2.378 10.11 0.236 34.09 1.651 27.00
Panel E: Birth-Year Cohort, 1939 ¡ 1943
ALL 199 5.914 3.683 4.190 32.80 2.494 38.46 2.575 16.33
Asset Holder 199 9.397 8.558 4.472 30.70 2.945 77.74 3.231 36.54
Panel F: Birth-Year Cohort, 1934 ¡ 1938
ALL 199 5.849 3.765 2.787 12.98 0.889 26.50 1.006 25.15
Asset Holder 193 10.26 9.777 3.310 15.57 1.322 69.09 1.901 51.70
Panel G: Birth-Year Cohort, 1929 ¡ 1933
ALL 199 6.446 8.065 10.16 125.1 0.625 107.4 1.017 24.44
Asset Holder 198 11.53 12.47 5.044 34.89 0.449 107.4 1.333 63.35
Panel H: Wealth-Consumption Ratio for All Birth-Year Cohorts (pooled synthetic panel)
ALL 995 5.832 4.677 11.57 229.6 0.625 107.4 1.567 20.65
Asset Holder 988 9.312 8.950 4.978 39.77 0.236 107.4 2.190 51.70
32Table 3.
GMM Estimation of Log-Linearized Euler Equations
Simple Cohort Synthetic Cohort Panel
Stock Return Risk Free Rate Joint
1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b
^ ¾ 0.271 0.878 0.259 0.980 2.313 3.027 0.519 1.485
[0.315] [0.804] [0.238] [0.496] [1.007] [1.103] [0.393] [0.668]
^ Á 0.04 0.055 0.025 0.048
[0.043] [0.029] [0.015] [0.024]
Observations 199 199 988 988 988 988 988 988
Hansen's J 2.29 0.04 5.79 0.07 2.82 0.19 5.35 0.01
P-value 0.32 0.85 0.06 0.80 0.24 0.67 0.07 0.90
Model Restriction Test:
Wald Statistics (Â2) 0.85 3.54 2.80 4.10
P-value 0.36 0.06 0.09 0.04
^ ¸ 0.87 1.05 0.05 0.26
95% Upper Bound 6.80 5.02 0.13 0.59
95% Lower Bound -5.05 -2.93 -0.02 -0.08
Mean of (w
c ) 8.93 9.31 9.31 9.31
Average Cell Size 40.47 8.15 8.15 8.15
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. The regressions also include ¢ln(familysize) and
twelve monthly dummies as explanatory variables and instruments. The instrument set for asset
return and wealth-consumption ratio also includes log dvidend-price ratio, lagged log real value
weighted NYSE returns, and lagged log real 30-day Treasury bill returns. The Hansen's J statistic
for overidenti¯cation test follows a Â2 distribution with 2 degrees of freedom in the restricted model
(with CRRA utility) and 1 degree of freedom in the unrestricted model (with temptation utility).
The null hypothesis for the model restriction test is that Á = 0 (or equivalently, ¸ = 0). The
Wald statistic for the restriction test has a Â2 distribution with 1 degree of freedom. The 95%
bounds for ^ ¸ is calculated using the \Delta method."
33